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Woe to the rebellious children, saith the Lord 
that take counsel, but not of me;
and that cover with a covering, but not of my spirit, 
that they may add sin to sin ...
Therefore shall the strength of Pharaoh be your shame 
























































































































































































At the end of January of this year Mr. Vadim Zagladin,
first deputy secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's
foreign affairs department, told a group of visiting
West German Young Socialists that the Soviet Union has
stopped deploying SS-20 milliles targeted on Western
Europe. This is the same Mr. Zagladin who a few days
earlier went on Hungarian radio to say :
"Those in the West who think we will show 
compliance on the issue of Euromissiles or 
any other question, because we have to 
support Poland, make a great mistake. The 
Soviet Union has never showed compliance 
over principal issues and will not do so 
now"
(The Times, Jan. 25 1982)
So this deployment stop is a pure gesture of good will. 
Except, of course, that about 280 of these rockets with 
three nuclear warheads each, are already in place. To 
these one may add about the same number of the older and 
less sophisticated SS-4s as well as about 25 SS-5s. 
According to Western estimates this represents about 
85% of the entire projected programme. Perhaps not a 
bad time to stop, especially since the other side hasn't 
even started its own deployment of "Euromissiles".
Mr. Zagladin would not say for how long the Soviet Union 
would hold out this olive branch. It would depend on 
what NATO would do.
At the beginning of February Leonid Brezhnev himself 
pointed out the importance of keeping things apart, 
human rights (not his term) on the one hand and 
armaments on the other, and called for "denouements" 
rather than "linkages".
In this realistic vein he made a number of proposals, 




























































































of nuclear arms from European soil. A most attractive 
proposition, it would seem. Except upon second thought 
it isn't much of a concession. Eastern European coun­
tries, other than the Soviet Union itself, have no 
nuclear weapons, nor will they be allowed to have any.
A nuclear-free zone in Europe involves therefore no 
sacrifices by Russia's allies and whereas Western 
Europe would remain without nuclear cover, the Soviet 
Union would just have to remove its missiles somewhat 
further inland. The missiles are perfectly capable 
of reaching targets in Western Europe if fired from 
behind the Urals. Seeing that the West is not yet 
quite prepared for a radical solution of this sort 
Brezhnev proposed a mutual reduction of medium range 
weapons down to 1/3 of their present strength by 1990.
The diminution of the stockpile of nuclear arms is 
doubtlessly desirable. But, as the arithmetic clearly 
suggests, the Brezhnev proposal leaves the present 
imbalance of nuclear armament intact. In terms of 
Western medium range missiles, one third of nothing 
is still nothing. Brezhnev can pretend he is suggesting 
a balanced reduction by counting American aeroplanes 
against Soviet missiles and leaving Soviet planes out of 
the account. He also proposed a Moratorium which once 
again would freeze the status quo. The Secretary General 
of the Soviet Communist Party was speaking at a reception 
in the Kremlin for the Consultative Council of Disarmament 
of the Socialist International, or rather to what there 
was of it, because the British, French, West German and 
Dutch representatives had refused to go to Moscow in 
view of the situation in Poland. Mr. Brezhnev spoke 




























































































with an eye to nuclear war" (I.H.T. 4.2.82) and 
emphasized that the Soviet Union placed peace 
ahead of all other objectives.
The same disarmament council of the Socialist 
International was told very similar things about 
the pacific goals of Soviet policy or its previous 
visit to Moscow in October 1979. It was told 
in particular that it was ludicrous even to 
suggest the possibility of Soviet military inter­
vention in a foreign country. That was three 
months before the invasion of Afghanistan.
A day after the Brezhnev anouncement President 
Reagan repeated his earlier offer to cancel 
the plans for the production and deployment 
of Western "Euromissiles" if the Soviet Union 
would stop putting up theirs and scrap the ones 
that are already in place. The "zero option" was 
once again rejected out of hand by the Soviet 
Union as a mere figleaf to cover ominous military 
plans.
To most people one nuclear weapon is much like 
another. They are all terrible instruments of 
intimidation and destruction. There are however 
different levels of nuclear weapons. It is 
important to keep such distinctions in mind if 
one wants to understand the moves and counter­
moves of the Superpowers, and in order to form 
a reasoned opinion of what is involved in doing 
without this or that weapons system or what it 



























































































Strategic nuclear arms are the "traditional" powerful 
weapons that can be carried over long distances by long 
range missiles or bombers. Their capacity for destruction 
is so great, that their use would cause a universal confla­
gration. They are therefore limited as instruments of policy 
to balancing each other out in the expectation that one 
threat cancells out the other. It is these weapons that are 
the object of the SALT negotiations and of the partial limi­
tations agreements that were reached at these talks. Different 
from these are tactical nuclear weapons, of much more
limited destructive power which can be thought of 
as extensions of conventional military equipment and, 
so the theory goes, could conceivably be used in a 
limited "battlefield" role without necessarily unleashing 
a massive response with strategic weapons. Finally, 
there are intermediate nuclear weapons, of medium range, 
such as the Soviet SS 20 missiles and the American 
Pershing and Cruise missiles of a wider scope than "battle­
field" arms; they are nevertheless limited to a relatively 
restricted potential "theatre" of war, such as Europe.
It is difficult to discuss nuclear arms dispassionately.
Their use would lead to such nightmarish results that it 
would be simply inhuman not to be filled with great fear 
and horror of what they can do to our world whichever 
"side" may ultimately be thought to be at fault assuming 
that "we" and "they" can be kept apart in the case of 
nuclear conflict. It is all the more important, therefore, 
to keep a cool head, which is very different from having 
a cold heart. One possible response to the threat of 
nuclear catastrophv is to refuse for one's own part, to 
contribute towards or even to tolerate the deployment of 
nuclear weapons. This position reflects a morality which 




























































































It does however raise new moral problems for 
leaving the field free for villains means de­
livering not only oneself, to which one perhaps 
has the right, but also one's fellow men into 
the villains' hands. Once the technology is 
there, someone will be tempted to use it if 
he thinks he can get away with it. Short of 
general nuclear disarmament the only plausible 
way of deterring an adversary from throwing 
the Bomb at you is to have one of your own he 
knows you can throw back at him. It may be a 
sad reflexion on human nature, but it is a bold 
man who would say that the absence of war in 
Europe for now close to fourty years is unre­
lated to the "Balance of Terror".
It is a different matter that anyone in his 
senses would like to see a negotiated, properly 
monitored and enforced limitation of horrible 
and costly arms. Achieving such an agreement 
is something else again. Wanting it alone will 
not do. Also, by definition, agreements cannot 
be unilateral. Apart from all other difficulties, 
it is not easy to determine what exactly constitutes 
a balance of asymétrie weapons systems, so that 
reasonable people, even when extremely well 
informed and technically competent may well 
disagree on particulars. The concept of 
deterrence also involves psychological consi­
derations that are difficult to evaluate.
It is hardly wise policy to take the logically 




























































































balance or imbalance by simply rushing ahead 
to make sure one has "more" that the other 
side. It is true that one cannot afford to 
be weak, but one must beware of oversimpli­
fications in wanting to argue "from strength". 
Such a policy is no better if catering to a 
populist desire to be "number one". In demo­
cracies, effective policies need popular support. 
It is the task of leadership to clarify, but 
not to falsify the meaning of policies in order 
to persuade rather than mislead public opinion.
A large section of American public opinion was 
misled by successive administrations who pre­
sented the valuable, but limited achievements 
of detente as leading to a "stable structure 
for peace". It was not, and could not be any­
thing of the kind. Having fallen out of that 
cloud with a bump, Americans feel they have 
been duped and they demand a policy of "though- 
ness". The sentiment is understandable, but 
it is once again up to the administration to 
lead, and not to allow its policy to become 
prisoner to jingoism and illusions of endless 
resources and impregnable American primacy in 
all fields.
No matter what the difficulties - conceptual, 
emotional, political and economic - of formu­
lating and implementing sensible policies 
regarding nuclear arms, it is necessary to have 
and be known to have the capacity for nuclear 
deterrence. It is not a matter of choice.
Once made,-the, invention of nuclear weapons 




























































































of all existing nuclear arms would not put us 
back in a state of nuclear innocence. Even so, 
universal nuclear disarmament would undoubtedly 
be a blessing. Such disarmament would of course 
have to be accompanied by appropriate and effective 
controls. The agreements limiting strategic 
nuclear arms that have been concluded so far are 
certainly valuable, but strictly circumscribed. 
There seems to be little hope of global nuclear 
disarmament. It is partly a matter of perceptions. 
The Soviet Union, for instance, does not differ­
entiate between conventional and nuclear forces 
in its military planning as presented in its 
own publications. Under such circumstances 
the high-minded morality of refusing to have 
anything to do with nuclear weapons under any 
circumstances must be weighed against the heard- 
headed and, I believe in effect more humane 
morality that seeks ways to prevent everyone 
from using such weapons.
What will not do, is the kind of lopsided 
special pleading which has lately become so 
common in Western Europe and particularly in 
Western Germany. West Germany's geographic 
position, its split national identity, the 
sectarian tradition of some of its churches, 
the long term "antimilitarizing" effects of 
a "reeducation" programme designed to correct 
past excesses are no doubt among the factors 




























































































view of nuclear armament. What is true of 
Western Germany is true a fortiori of West 
Berlin.
A group of prominent West Berliners, headed 
by the former Governing-Mayor Heinrich Albertz 
and including authors, academics, actors, 
physicians and clergymen issued in September 
of 1981 an "Appeal from Berlin to the People 
of the USA".
This text is well worth discussing in some 
detail because of the intellectual distinction 
of those who sign it and because it is an 
excellent summary of the "unilateralist" argu­
ments being advanced in Germany today. It is, 
needless to say no less significant for what it 
passes over in silence than for what it spells 
out:
"We, a group of West Berlin citizens, 
want to express our deepening sense of 
apprehension and alarm at the military 
policy of the Reagan administration."
This is an ably constructed sentence, which without
doing violence to the language, personalizes the
source of apprehension and appeals over the head
of the "nasty man" and his associates to the
"American People". It would never have done to
speak of "U.S. defense policy". That would
have rung all the wrong bells : it would take
away the aggressive edge of the word "military"
and suggest that the President is, for better




























































































of the United States. So far we have no more
than quite admissible rhetorical emphasis.
"The construction of a new generation 
of American nuclear weapons is raising 
political and social tensions through­
out the world and promises to drasti­
cally increase the risk of nuclear war".
This states the thesis advanced in the Appeal.
It has to be seen in the light of what follows 
in its support. It does however already raise 
some important questions : why would the construe 
tion of new nuclear weapons increase the danger 
of war ? Weapons are not as such the causes of 
war any more than money is the cause of greed.
On the other hand, if a new weapon being intro­
duced is seen to unsettle a balance in armaments 
thought to be crucial in discouraging hostilities 
then indeed, the new weapon has a destabilizing 
effect. The only weapon that could really do 
this, would be one capable of such a swift, 
precise and extensive preemptive strike as to 
make retaliation impossible. But this is not 
what the fuss is about. In fact the so-called 
strategic nuclear weapons, the "Big-Bombs" are 
not referred to anywhere in the Berlin Appeal.
"The proposed stationing of Pershing II 
and Cruise missiles in Western Europe has 
catalyzed an unprecedented opposition 
movement. In the Federal Republic alone 
over 1 1/2 million people have signed 
petitions against the stationing of 
Pershing II and Cruise missiles on 
European soil. In Hamburg more than 
100.000 Protestant Christians recently 




























































































This Fall hundreds of demonstrations 
and teach-ins will take place in the 
Federal Republic to protest the present 
United States military build-up."
The big fuss is about medium-range nuclear missiles. 
It is certainly true that, whatever its histo­
rical and ideological origins, the large wave 
of pacifist/unilateralist protest got rolling 
in response to the NATO decision in December 
of 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Ground Laun­
ched Cruise Missiles on Western European soil.
A large and vociferous protest movement pre­
sumably indicates that there is a prima facie 
reason for concern. It does not of course tell 
us much about the merits of the case. The 
number of people marching or attending rallies 
is a poor indicator of the worth of their cause.
In evaluating the protest it would be useful 
to know for instance what proportion of the 
petitions were signed in the spirit of "down 
with nukes" rather than "down with new American 
nukes only". It is, no doubt, psychologically 
easier and perhaps politically more effective 
to protest about things not yet introduced 
than about things that are already there.
It is again a neat rhetorical device to 
underscore the fact that one of the most 
important demonstrations against the installation 
of Western medium range missiles was staged by 
"Protestant Christians".
The appeal is addressed to the American people, 
which is imbued with Protestant values. A large 
number of Americans are bound to view the protest 




























































































by "atheist fellow-travellers". On the other 
hand the large majority of the American public 
is not likely to be aware of some of the more 
disturbing aspects of German Protestantism.
There is a virulent millenarist-sectarian strand 
among the German Protestant churches. Neutralist 
sentiment in the interest of German unity is no 
novelty. It has always played an important 
role in Protestant "Kirchentage" or great national 
church meets. It has also been remarkable that 
many protestant clergymen who have been protagonists 
in the condemnation of nuclear energy -for peaceful 
as well as for military purposes- never seem 
to extend their -possibly perfectly justified- 
censure beyond the Elbe.1 So much, as it were, 
ad hominem.
But what of the substance of the argument ?
"We are told that the Pershing II and 
Cruise missiles will deter the Soviet 
Union from attacking Western Europe 
by providing the United States and 
NATO with means to "win" an atomic 
war. "
This is both inaccurate and wrong-headed.
Medium range nuclear missiles do not constitute 
an American or Western technological break­
through which might be thought capable of 
"outsmarting" the Soviet weapons systems thus 
making "victory" in a nuclear conflict possible.
They are rather meant to counterbalance a 
Soviet breakthrough on comparable terms in 
order to make even "limited" nuclear war un­
thinkable. Unlike NATO's medium range weapons 
that have yet to be deployed, the Soviet Union
1 . See the forceful article by François-Georges Dreyfus, 
"Pacifisme et neutralisme en Allemagne Fédérale aujourd'hui", 




























































































already has close to 300 of them in place, 
targeted on Western Europe, and their number 
is apparently still increasing, despite the 
statements of Mr. Zagladin (Times, Feb.6,1982). 
This presumably strikes the signatories of the 
"Appeal" as a perfectly pacific pursuit.
The point about these weapons is that their 
range and their accuracy, which permits them, 
for instance, to concentrate on strictly military 
targets, could conceivably allow them to be used 
within the confines of one "theater" of war, say 
in Western Europe, without automatically provoking 
the massive retaliation with "strategic" weapons 
by the Superpower allied to the attacked countries. 
The protective Superpower might well be reluctant 
to use its strategic arms, for fear of a strategic 
counterretaliation. Following this logic, the 
European allies get nervous about "decoupling", 
and about the American atomic umbrella folding 
over their heads. They recognize that the days 
when an American President could warm people's 
hearts and carry conviction by saying "Ich bin 
ein Berliner" are long gone. It is easy to 
imagine that America, post-Vietnam, self-concerned 
America, might well hesitate to bring down an 
atomic war upon its head just for the likes of us. 
President Reagan caused an uproar, by saying 
something very much like that. It is to reassure 
the Europeans, and under the persistent pressure 
of the West German Chancellor himself that the 




























































































Pershings and Cruise Missiles was taken. It 
certainly doesn't stem from the desire of the 
U.S. to start any European wars they might hope 
to "win". The deployment of NATO medium range 
missiles can only be conceived as a threat to 
peace, if it is assumed that the Soviet Union, 
not the U.S., might be willing to unleash a 
preemptive attack before the missiles are in 
place, in order to preserve its present enormous 
advantage. But if this is so, the "Appeal" is 
knocking on the wrong door.
The concept of "limited" nuclear war is certainly 
open to many questions. The Soviet SS20s and their 
Western counterparts are still very destructive 
things, despite their accuracy. The dynamic 
character of all wars suggests it may be very 
difficult to prevent escalations. The intermediate 
range missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and to 
be deployed by NATO are still under the direct
control of the respective Superpowers. One wonders 
therefore, why the Soviet Union, for instance, 
would shoot back at the Western European launching 
pad rather than at the missile's mother country. 
This brings us back to global strategic deterrence, 
which means that producing and installing the new 
weaponry could be a waste. On the other hand these 
weapons may, for all I know, be worth every penny 
spent on them if, everything considered, they 
provide a "credible deterrent"; credible not 





























































































The NATO plan to counterbalance the Soviet armoury 
at a certain level does not increase the risk 
of war. One may argue that it is superfluous, 
but not that it is damaging to a balance which 
it is in fact intended to reestablish. The other 
wrong impression conveyed by the tone of the 
"Appeal" is that the new weapons, by being techno­
logically more advanced must also be even more 
inhuman than their cruder forerunners. It is 
hard to see why more accurate, and therefore 
less wantonly destructive weapons should be 
humanly more repulsive and morally more objectionable 
than technically less sophisticated arms which are 
only capable of indiscriminate destruction on a vast 
scale.
"The recent decision of the Reagan admini­
stration to build the neutron bomb has 
only unleashed additional revulsion and 
opposition".
The fact is undoubtedly true. The question to ask 
is whether the reaction was justified. what 
was said about the relative 'moral' merits of the 
technologically more advanced against the more 
indiscriminate weapons also applies to the neutron 
Bomb. It must be because people are accustommed 
to exponential growth in all fields that they 
automatically assume that a new Bomb must be 
even more horrible than an old Bomb. In fact 
the neutron Bomb is much more precise in its 
scope and much less destructive in its effects 
than the older devices. While capable of killing 




























































































it produces and the radioactive fallout it leaves 
behind is greatly reduced by comparison to nuclear 
warheads as we have had them so far. Used against 
a massive tank formation, for instance, it would 
stop the advance by killing the crews without 
ravaging and poisoning vast stretches of possibly 
densely populated country. This is surely less 
rather than more sinister than letting everything 
go up in one great mushroom. The revulsion would 
have been justified if the choice were not between 
one Bomb and another but between a Bomb and no 
Bomb. Neatly separated by four paragraphs from 
this first evocation of (largely misunderstood) 
nuclear horror, the "Appeal" takes a more so­
phisticated approach to the neutron Bomb.
"... the neutron bomb (is) a weapon 
which is supposed to make atomic 
war "thinkable"."
This is presumably just because it is less 
destructive. But what does "making atomic war 
' thinkable mean ? The implication seems to 
be that the introduction of the neutron Bomb 
is evidence of an intention to conduct a limited 
nuclear war, suddenly made possible by technology. 
This is not at all the same as the fact that 
a deterrent can only do its job, to deterr and 
prevent a war, if the adversary knows that one 
is able and if driven to it willing to use it.
The "Appeal" is unfair if it suggests, however 
indirectly, that those responsible for introducing 
the neutron Bomb are actually eager to use it. It 
does however raise the legitimate question : what is 




























































































The problem is posed by the great imbalance of 
conventional forces in Europe. Warsaw Pact 
Divisions outnumber NATO Divisions in Northern 
and Central Europe by more than 2 to 1 and the 
Warsaw Pact has almost three times as many tanks 
in this area as the Western Alliance. This 
strength is enhanced by geography -the lack of 
depth of Western Europe, poor communication lines, 
etc.1 The Soviet Union has consistently maintained 
and increased the strength of its (nuclear and 
conventional) forces since World War II, through 
cold war, detente and after. One wonders why.
It is true that these armies came in handy when 
people who didn't know their own good started 
trouble in places like Budapest, or Prague.
But surely a military apparatus of such magnitude, 
maintained at enormous expense, can hardly be 
justified by police duties alone.
The moment American monopoly and then even 
American superiority in nuclear arms was gone, 
the moment that is that the Soviet Union was 
capable of retaliatory strikes against the United 
States itself, the strategic nuclear deterrent 
was seen to offer insufficient protection against 
the conventional military strength of the Soviet 
Union. This has led to attempts since the 1950's 
to develop "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear 
weapons able to make up for the relative weak­
ness of NATO's conventional forces. The neutron 
Bomb is the first such device which can be plausibly 
expected not to have such disastrous side effects
1. See The Military Balance 1980-1981, The International 




























































































on the countryside and the civilian population 
as to make it usable at all. In this sense, 
the authors of the "Appeal" are right when they 
say that the neutron Bomb is "supposed to make 
nuclear war thinkable". The asymetry of the 
means, "nuclear" versus "conventional" power, 
makes it hard to determine the real worth of 
"tactical" nuclear weapons. Nuclear is nuclear, 
however qualified.
"If the neutron bomb were ever to be 
used in Europe or anywhere else in the 
world, it could open up an age of 
unlimited atomic wars. Pershing II's,
Cruise missiles and neutron bombs on 
European soil could not only unleash an 
atomic war here. We believe that such 
a conflict would quickly escalate and 
turn the entire northern hemisphere 
into a nuclear wasteland."
Well, it could. The question is, do these arms provide a 
plausible enough disincentive to discourage actions which 
-might necessitate their use. What are the alternatives ?
The alternative to "tactical" nuclear arms is an extensive 
European conventional rearmament, despite the heavy economic 
and political burden it would place on the countries 
of Western Europe or a major reduction of Soviet 
conventional forces, which does not look very 
likely.
In any case, neither possibility is envisaged in 
the "Appeal".
"As West Berliners living in the West 
but surrounded by the East we have 
had the privilege of experiencing first 
hand the benefits of détente. We believe 
from the results of this experience that 





























































































dialogue and understanding -not 
weapons superiority- can provide 
a working framework for peace"
This is one of the strangest paragraphs in the 
whole document. No doubt West Berlin was parti­
cularly sensitive to whatever advantages détente 
had to offer, in terms of economic, cultural 
and human exchanges. Trade is a good thing and 
if both sides profit it doesn't necessarily matter 
who gets the better deal. The possibility of 
visiting tante Hannah in what used to be called 
Chemnitz might even in itself be worth the vast 
transfers of technology and credit from wTest to 
East. But having established links of this nature, 
who has the greatest interest in maintaining them, 
who can least afford to pick a fight, the lender 
or the borrower ? Who was it then who killed 
détente ? Again we find our "Appeal" knocking 
on the wrong door.
Was it the American people who made a spitoon 
out of the third basket (human rights, rather 
than guns or butter) of the Helsinki Accord ?
Was it the American government that subjected 
to psychiatric treatment people who checked 
whether the stipulations of this crowning Act 
of détente were observed ? Every face has only 
two cheeks to offer to the bully, no more.
Never mind the Horn of Africa, Angola, etc.,
which may plausibly be put down as "power struggles",
indirect confrontations between Superpowers,
where the lines of demarcation were not hard




























































































in the period of détente any advance of American 
influence, such as the turning around of Egypt, 
was obtained by peaceful means, whereas the gains 
of Soviet interest were obtained by military 
violence. But what possible overarching conflict 
can be cited as an explanation for the invasion 
of Afghanistan ?
"West Berliners living in the West but
surrounded by the East"
also seem to have short memories. Who was it 
who blocaded them, and who by contrast set up 
airbridges to keep them alive and in the West ? 
Unless they do not care to be in the West, but 
that is not what they say.
A recipe for détente : first build a wall, than 
open a tiny opening, provide it with a pay gate, 
make a point of making the gate work capriciously 
and call it progress. If someone bangs his fist 
in frustration, call him a bloodthirsty fascist. 
Yes, indeed let us deepen East-West dialogue and 
understanding. But the authors of the "Appeal" 
seem to have taken as a model the later dialogues 
of Plato in which one of the interlocutors says 
nothing other than "Yes, Socrates", "Quite so, 
Socrates", "It would be hard to quarel with what 
you say, Socrates".
Of course discussion is invaluable to peace.
It is undoubtedly a necessary condition. But 
hardly a sufficient one. Or do we have a case 




























































































The next paragraph is indeed one of deep though 
selective empathy.
"The people of the Soviet Union have 
never forgotten the invasion of their 
country by Germany during the Second 
World War. More than 20 million 
Russians died as a result of the war.
Like all of us in the West the Soviet 
people are deeply afraid of a coming 
nuclear war. And now intermediate 
range missiles, able to reach Moscow 
in less than five minutes, are to be 
deployed in the Federal Republic!"
Here is the contrast to "the Reagan Administration" :
"the people of the Soviet Union". People good,
Government bad. The list of peoples who have
never forgotten the invasion of their country
by Germany would be long indeed. Most of them,
unlike the Soviet Union never even dreamt of
signing a pact with Hitler in order to gobble up
their smaller neighbours undisturbed.1 If, indeed,
one can find fault with these countries, it is
that they let the bully get away with bloody
murder, literally, in order to secure "peace in
their time". We know how well they succeeded.
The memory of German occupation has not prevented
these other countries from creating close bonds
of cooperation and friendship with post-war Germany.
What is it that puts the Soviet People in a class
apart ? Apparently the size of their sufferings.
No one denies the enormous sacrifices made by
the Soviet Union in the War. But what is this
l.The Hitler— Stalin pact was concluded on Aug.23,1939. Poland was partitioned in September of that year. The present Eastern border 
of Poland is little different frpm the Molotov-von Ribentropp line 
resulting from that pièce of European Cooperation. Letonia Estonia 
and Lithuania lost the last vestiges of independence.in 1940. Finland, because of it valorous resistance had to surrender only parts of its 
territory to the Soviet Union, in the same year. It was also the year 





























































































gruesome body count ? Above a certain number 
of war victims a people cannot but be mistrustful 
of the Germans, below that level it is likely 
to be its friend and ally ? It is of course 
nothing but the adoption of the propagandistic 
Soviet view of World War II as of the "Great 
Patriotic War". It involves no disrespect to 
the great Soviet contribution to that World War 
to say that it is grossly insensitive for German 
intellectuals to adopt that view in an Appeal 
to a people that has lost thousands of good men 
fighting for the liberation of Europe from the 
Nazis. Furthermore, the breastbeating and concern 
about the presumed Soviet sensibility towards 
"l'éternelle Allemagne" might perhaps pass, if 
one were speaking of German defence alone. But 
it is Western European defense we are talking 
about. It is simply callous to associate other 
peoples with a historical burden which weighs 
on Germany alone. It is also useful to remember 
that whatever the Soviet people may remember 
or may not be allowed to forget about German 
agression, the Soviet leadership did not hesitate 
for a moment to send in German troops, Saxon 
and Prussian goosestepping troops, to crush the 
Spring of Prague, thus redoubling the horror 
of the Checoslovaks.
We are indeed all deeply afraid of a coming nuclear 
war. Which is why we want to make sure that all 
of us are sufficiently afraid not to start one.




























































































Europe will be able to reach Moscow in five minutes.
The Soviet Union already has such missiles, capable 
of reaching London in about the same time, give 
or take a minute, and that might not go down too 
well with those who remember the Blitz, whether 
the rocket is fired in Mecklenburg or in Minsk, 
or for that matter in Kant's native city of 
Kaliningrad.
The implied concommittant of a presumed Soviet 
fear of medium range nuclear weapons based in 
Germany is that by the same token Germany would 
be primary target of Soviet nuclear attack.
This may well be true, but it is a great illusion 
to think that only countries equipped with nuclear 
arms will be subject to nuclear attack. Witness 
the angry letter of a Swedish woman to Leonid 
Brezhnev, which was in the papers not long ago, 
in which she expresses the most bitter disillusionment, 
that despite all the statements to the contrary, the 
Soviet Union did train nuclear weapons on non­
nuclear, neutral Sweden as evidenced in the cargo 
of the "whisky" class submarine that got stranded 
on the Swedish shore.
"Euroshima no I" is a slogan seen on the walls 
of many European cities and expresses an under­
standable fear, but it misses a central point 
of its own allusion : That the U.S. could only 
afford to drop the Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
because the Japanese had nothing of the sort 
to throw back at them.
Germany's geographic position and its importance 




























































































dangers. If, as the authors of the "Appeal" 
suggest we also consider a "sale Boshe" view 
of Germans as prevailing in the Soviet Union, 
it is difficult to see that Germany would be 
spared in the case of armed conflict, whether 
American missiles are stationed on its soil or 
not.
"WHO CAN SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THE DEPLOYMENT 
OF PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN 
EUROPE WILL STRENGTHEN THE PROSPECTS OF 
PEACE ?"
In view of what was said before, the answer to
the rhetorical question is : a lot of thoughtful,
informed and peaceloving people. Given the
problematic nature of the concept of deterrence
I am not myself certain that the production and
deployment of these missiles is in fact necessary.
I would much prefer to be certain in a matter
involving enormous amounts of money and giving
rise to great political risks. But I am not.
What is certain is that the Western medium range
missiles do not bring any additional threats to
peace, if it isn't through the emotional and
unreasoned reactions to them in the West.
"West Germany already has the highest 
density of atomic weapons per square 
mile of any country in the world.
Within this powder-keg environment 
which is our home, the Reagan admi­
nistration is taking steps to place 
the neutron bomb, ...
All this sounds very dramatic, as in many ways 
it is. Increasing the possibility of accidents 
is a matter for concern. But one can easily 




























































































the same kind of absurdity as the endless race
for quantitative nuclear superiority. Here we
have the bizzare case of "overkill" in reverse.
Germans, like other people, can only die once.
"WE ALONG WITH MILLIONS OF OTHER 
EUROPEAN CITIZENS, WILL NEVER 
ACCEPT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
IN EUROPE."
Why just "additional" nuclear weapons ? Is it 
so important for the maintenance of peace that 
the enormous Soviet advantage be maintained ? 
This partisan view becomes cynical in the next 
paragraph.
"The present American arms build-up 
is creating fear. Fear leads to hate 
and not to respect. The United States 
will be respected, if it respects the 
integrity and independence 'of its 
Allies and it treats all peoples of 
the world as having equal rights. It 
will be respected, if it shows genuine 
willingness to negotiate."
The American build-up creates fear. The Soviet 
build-up, which it is meant to answer, relent­
lessly and coldbloodedly pursued all through 
détente presumably confers a feeling of 
security and repose. There is no need to treat 
the Macchiavellian point about whether a Prince 
should seek to be loved or to be feared. The 
important thing is to see that the authors of 
the "Appeal" invariably construe American 
strength as a menace, Soviet strength, by 
implication, as necessary for the defence of 
a much abused people whereas the only proper 
Western European posture for assuring peace is 




























































































back hoping that the canine nature of its adversary 
will then prevent him from tearing out its throat. 
But how bigotted does one have to be to lecture 
the American people on the respect of the integrity 
and independence of its Allies in the midst of 
the Polish crisis ? Certainly the American 
presence in Europe is not alien to American in­
terests. But it does not seem to have occured 
to the signatories of the "Appeal" that the 
American people and the U.S. Government would 
only be too glad if the Europeans themselves 
were able and willing to take up the slack of 
their own defence. Independence is all very 
well. But Sweden and France for instance or 
even Switzerland are armed to the teeth.
The flagrant disrespect of the Soviet Union for 
the integrity and independence of its Allies, 
of which the direct interventions in Hungary, 
Checoslovakia, etc. are but the most explicit 
manifestations, have not endangered peace in 
Europe. The Soviet Union has been able to get 
its way with impunity because of the pragmatic 
understanding which mistakenly goes under the 
name of Yalta. As a formula for the avoidance 
of war, though not for the advancement of justice 
or the respect for equal rights of the peoples 
in the world, the understanding has worked.
But I do not think that this is the kind of 
East-West understanding the authors of the 
"Appeal" had in mind.
Willingness to negotiate "must entail readiness 




























































































December 1979 decision of NATO was a double 
decision : to ask the Soviet Union to dismantle 
medium range weapons, targeted on Europe or, 
in the case of refusal, to produce and deploy 
their counterparts. Again later, and now again 
President Reagan proposed what is known as the 
"zero option".
To say that the proposal was made as a propaganda 
gesture in the knowledge that the Soviet Union 
would reject it, is to beg the question of the 
Soviet readiness to disarm. The "Appeal" having 
been issued in September 1981 could not have 
considered the offers of the zero option. I 
doubt that it would have made much difference.
We have to complete the sentence. In the view 
of the writers of the "Appeal" willingness to 
negotiate must entail readiness to disarm uni- 
lateraly.
Qui desiderat pacem praeparat bellum. It has 
become quite fashionable to play on this maxim 
of ancient prudence and to say instead that if 
you desire peace, prepare peace. It is a catchy 
phrase which has the sound of common sense.
But what does it mean ? Peace can be maintained 
when it exists and it can be established after 
a war. But how can it be prepared ? Peace, 
like liberty, is not a thing that can be obtained 
once and for all, a harbour that can be reached 




























































































and overcomes the seamonsters. Maintaining peace 
is more like keeping the ship on an even keel 
under changing circumstances. It requires constant 
and repeated efforts, difficult adjustments, 
laborious and mostly tedious negotiations occasionally 
leavened by acts of imaginative statesmanship.
But none of these is incompatible with being 
prepared for war. On the contrary.
There is no system of international relations 
that can exclude the possibility of armed conflict. 
Isaiah is often quoted to the contrary, but the 
relevant passage is rarely quoted in full. It is 
not just that such things as beating swords into 
plowshares will come to pass "in the last days" 
and not before. Such things, shall only be possible 
because the Lord "shall judge the nations and 
shall rebuke many people". I doubt that Isaiah 
was prophesying the coming of Dr. Waldheim.
Therefore, providing for the common defence remains 
a necessary task of government. Determining 
exactly what constitutes adequate provision for 
the common defence is a different matter.
Obviously, decisions about armaments, troops, 
supplies etc. like all political decisions, are 
not taken in a disinterested vacuum, dans le 
silence des passions. What is often erroneously 
concluded from this fact is that such decisions 
are nothing but a reflection of particular 
interests. But firstly, though interests influence, 
they do not determine courses of action and 
secondly the interests of even very small groups 




























































































the same direction. Furthermore any identifiable 
interest competes against other countervailing 
interests as it seeks to influence public policy. 
Finally, in some countries, though not in others, 
those who take the decisions are answerable to 
the public that put them in and which can vote 
them out.
Such considerations notwithstanding, conspiracy 
theories abound. Wars are not seen to result 
from irréconciliable differences between countries, 
from conflicting interests, widely differing 
views of the world and poor defences against 
the desires for domination.'and agrandizement, 
but from the perfidious machinations 
of sinister men who can manipulate their people 
into "using their creative potential for war".
Such theories channel frustration about the 
complexity of an imperfect world into a 
psychologically more manageable hatred of the 
alleged culprits. They also hold out the illusory 
but attractive prospect of a concommitant "if only" 
theory. The maintenance of peace need not be the 
sisyphian task it is, "if only" one got rid of 
whoever is always kicking the stone back down 
the hill. The "Appeal", in fairness, does not 
go that far. But it raises the question why 
the American people alone is admonished to wield 
the hammer while the Soviet Union is busily beating its 
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